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Abstract
Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) surged in popularity in 2020 and 2021.
For the first time in U.S. history, more SPAC IPOs occurred in a particular year than traditional
IPOs and direct listings. Amidst the increase in SPAC IPOs, an expanding number of celebrities
became involved with these investment vehicles. This thesis investigates the trend of celebritybacked SPACs by examining how celebrity involvement or association with a SPAC may affect
the performance of these equities in the market.
This study examines the SPAC period returns, deSPAC period returns, IPO sizes, deal
lengths, and PIPE financing amounts of 339 SPAC deals that closed between November 30, 2017,
to March 17, 2022. SPAC period returns are annualized and measured as of the date of business
combination. The deSPAC period returns are measured at the following intervals: one day, three
months, and one year following a business combination. I find that there is not a significant
difference in the common share performance between celebrity-backed and non-celebrity-backed
SPACs at the 90% confidence level at any of the four intervals analyzed. Moreover, IPO sizes,
PIPE financing amounts, and deal length are not found to have a significant effect on SPAC or
deSPAC period performance. Given that the celebrity-backing of SPACs is a recent phenomenon,
future studies should investigate whether there is a celebrity effect on common share performance
past the one-year deSPAC interval.
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1. Introduction
Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) are an alternative way to take companies public
as opposed to the traditional initial public offering (IPO) or direct listing process. A SPAC is a
type of blank check company that does not have any actual operations but that merely exists with
the purpose of facilitating a business combination with a non-listed company, thus taking the nonlisted company public. Given this structure, the life cycle of SPACs is often divided into two
periods: the SPAC period and the deSPAC period, with the SPAC period occurring before a
business combination and the deSPAC period occurring afterwards. While traditional IPOs
typically involve investment bankers and underwriters for funding, SPACs go public with the
purpose of raising cash funds to support a possible acquisition of a private company. These cash
funds come from sponsors, who comprise the management team for the SPAC and individually
contribute to the SPAC fund, and from investors. Proceeds from sponsors are typically used to pay
for the IPO underwriting fees and operating costs of a SPAC while proceeds from other investors
are generally used to bring a target company public.
Due to regulations, a SPAC goes public without a specific target company in mind,
resulting in uncertainty for investors over what they are buying into. Thus, before a SPAC
announces a target, investors are betting that the SPAC’s sponsor team is competent enough in
selecting a viable company to merge with. Until a business merger is consummated or the SPAC
is liquidated, all funds contributed to a SPAC, less certain fees and expenses, are kept in an escrow
(trust) account. While the proceeds are kept in the trust account, they are restricted and are
normally invested in interest-bearing instruments. Each SPAC is generally given around two years
to find a private company target to acquire and take public. To successfully merge with a company,
a majority of the SPAC’s investors must vote for the merger. SPAC investors may elect to redeem
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their shares after a merger announcement instead of getting shares in the new public company. In
addition, investors may redeem their shares even if they vote in favor of the specified business
combination.
Although a SPAC generally has around 24 months to complete a business combination, a
SPAC can attempt to extend this deadline if necessary. However, time extensions can be risky and
have limits to their effectiveness. For each extension, investors can vote on whether to proceed
with the extension while simultaneously redeeming their shares in the SPAC. Even if an extension
is successful, there is no guarantee that the SPAC will complete a business combination. If a SPAC
fails to merge with a target within the SPAC’s specified time frame or during an extension period,
the SPAC is liquidated, and the funds held in the trust account are returned to the shareholders.
For sponsors, the liquidation of a SPAC results in the loss of the entirety of a sponsor’s
investments. Despite the risks associated with sponsoring a SPAC, sponsors can stand to do very
well off if a merger is consummated. According to Klausner, Ohlrogge, and Ruan (2022), sponsors
can obtain around 20% of post-IPO equity whilst contributing a relatively small amount to the
SPAC. Since sponsors can receive a large portion of post-IPO equity at little cost, sponsors have
an incentive to complete a merger with a company, even if the deal is bad for investors as a whole.
Since 2010, SPACs have generally been priced at $10 per share at the SPAC IPO and differ
in varying ways from SPACs of previous eras. Each share of a SPAC typically includes a portion
of a warrant to buy a share of the post-merger company in the future. The number of these warrants
offered to SPAC shareholders has gradually been declining in recent years. Moreover, from 2010,
the exercise price of warrants has shifted from being at a 15% to 30% discount to the SPAC IPO
price to being at a 15% premium to the SPAC IPO price (Gahng, Ritter, and Zhang, 2022). The
post-2010 SPAC period has several other noticeable differences in comparison to the SPAC
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periods of 1993-1999 and 2000-2009. In their paper, Gahng, Ritter, and Zhang (2022) note that
post-2010 SPACs are typically larger than those in previous periods, have less up-front
underwriting costs, and generally have a higher percentage of SPAC IPO proceeds that are placed
in trust accounts. Furthermore, prior to 2010, SPAC shareholders could not vote in favor of a
business combination and also redeem their shares. However, since 2010, these decisions have
been allowed to be made separately.
These factors, along with recent macroeconomic trends, may explain why SPACs have
drastically increased in popularity over the past several years. Bazerman and Patel (2021) of the
Harvard Business Review note that some of the growth in SPAC popularity could be attributed to
a recent combination of factors, including: “an excess of available cash, a proliferation of start-ups
seeking liquidity or growth capital, and regulatory changes that ha[ve] standardized SPAC
products”. Passador (2021) adds that “retail investors approaching not only the equity markets but
SPACs too, long-only institutional investors increasing attention”, and a diversifying of sponsors
have contributed to the recent spike in SPAC activity. Based on a dossier released by Statista
(2022), U.S. SPAC proceeds in 2010 amounted to around $503 million. Over the course of the
2010s, the popularity of SPACs slowly grew. Then, in 2021, the U.S. SPAC market reached a
fever pitch as over $162 billion worth of proceeds were contributed to SPAC IPOs (Statista, 2022).
Alongside the growth in SPAC proceeds, the number of annual SPAC IPOs ballooned from 7 in
2010 to 613 in 2021. Due to this massive growth, for the first time in the U.S. stock market’s
history, there were more SPAC IPOs in 2020 and 2021 than traditional IPOs. Figure 1 outlines the
shifts in the amount of SPAC IPOs and proceeds from 2017 to the third quarter of 2022.
Given the market’s recent favorable sentiment toward SPACs, it is understandable why
some celebrities have started sponsoring and becoming involved with these financial entities.
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According to Ramkumar (2021), SPACs have witnessed a “reputational shift”, and “the biggest
names in sports, politics, business and entertainment are involved.” In Ramkumar’s article, a host
of celebrities are listed as being involved in the SPAC surge. These celebrities include Shaquille
O’Neal, Serena Williams, Ciara, Paul Ryan, Colin Kaepernick, and an array of other names. This
article and others published over the past several years help illustrate the point that celebrity SPAC
activity is not limited to business figures. Aside from this, SPACs have become so mainstream
that one individual, Chamath Palihapitiya, has even been dubbed as the “King of SPACs” (CNBC
Editor Team, 2021). Based on information provided via SPAC Research, Palihapitiya, a venture
capitalist and former executive at Facebook, has been on the sponsor board of at least ten SPACs.
It is also worth mentioning that former U.S. President Donald Trump’s media company intends to
merge with a SPAC, Digital World Acquisition Company. Although the deal is under SEC
investigation, the existence of this proposed business combination speaks to how much SPACs
have entered mainstream discussion. In examining Palihapitiya, Trump, and other celebrities’
extensive involvement in SPACs, it is important to consider why celebrities are getting involved
with these investment vehicles.
There are two reasons that I propose that may explain why celebrities are interested in
sponsoring SPACs. First, since many celebrities already hold significant sums of wealth,
sponsoring a SPAC may be a useful way for these individuals to reinvest their fortunes with the
hopes of acquiring a valuable stake in a newly traded company. Such investments have low
correlations with their existing portfolio. According to Feng et al. (2022), SPAC sponsors typically
pay around $25,000 each for a combined stake that is generally equivalent to 25% of a SPAC’s
IPO shares, “after accounting for any over-allotment option.” Compared to the millions of dollars
contributed by institutional and retail investors, sponsors can obtain a large share of a SPAC for
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relatively little cost. If a SPAC completes a business combination and the newly traded company
performs well, sponsors can stand to make a handsome profit if they decide to sell their shares. On
the other hand, if a business combination is completed and shares perform poorly in relation to the
IPO price, sponsors can still have a valuable stake in the company compared to the funds that the
sponsors contributed.
Aside from the first reason for celebrity involvement, SPACs may offer a way for
celebrities to bring awareness to a specific cause or to provide significant financial support to
companies that align with their values. For example, based on a prospectus for Evolv
Technologies, celebrity athletes Peyton Manning, Andre Agassi, and Steffi Graf “want America
to re-open, and re-open safely” as the United States comes out of the COVID-19 pandemic and
fans return to sports venues (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2021). Within this
prospectus, celebrity endorsement is perceived to align with an altruistic desire for public safety
and well-being in the post-COVID environment. Aside from this example, as new corporate
standards, like environmental, social, and governance standards (ESG), become more widely
adopted, celebrity sponsorship of SPACs could be increasingly driven by personal beliefs and
ideals. Although there may be other reasons for why celebrities have decided to get involved with
these investment vehicles, I perceive that these are two plausible explanations.
Despite the growth of celebrity SPACs, this trend has not been met with glee by all parties.
For instance, in March 2021, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a
warning to investors, stating: “It is never a good idea to invest in a SPAC just because someone
famous sponsors or invests in it or says it is a good investment.” But should the SEC be concerned?
Over the past few years, some research has been done to analyze the role and importance that
sponsors and SPAC visibility can have in the SPAC process and SPAC performance. In “Perverse
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incentives of special purpose acquisition companies, the ‘poor man’s private equity funds’”,
Dimitrova (2017) asserts that if one of a SPAC’s “sponsors is appointed as chairman” of the same
SPAC’s newly merged company, the company’s “long-run returns are at least 57 percentage points
higher after adjusting for industry movements”. In another paper, titled “SPAC IPOs and Sponsor
Network Centrality”, Lin, Lu, Michaely, and Qin (2021) discuss the varying impacts that SPAC
sponsors can have on the SPAC process and post-merger returns. They find that there is a “high
M&A success rate of high network centrality SPAC sponsors” (Lin et al, 2021). Further, Lin et al.
(2021) conclude that “sponsors with a high PE network centrality can outperform those with a low
network centrality because they have superior deal sourcing ability”. Lastly, in “Social Media
Influence on SPACs”, Zhang (2021) finds that heightened Twitter activity after a SPAC merger
announcement is associated with increased trading volumes for the associated SPAC.
With studies like these emphasizing the importance of SPAC sponsorship, internal
involvement, and SPAC publicity, it appears to be worth exploring whether celebrity sponsorship
can have an impact on SPAC performance. To expand upon the sponsor research that has already
been done in the SPAC space, this paper investigates celebrity-sponsored special purpose
acquisition companies by examining SPAC common equity returns at four intervals: the date of a
business combination, the next trading day following a business combination, three months
following a business combination, and one year following a business combination.
Through utilizing an article published by the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and performing
sponsor searches on SPAC Research, a sample of 28 celebrity SPACs that have closed deals are
selected for analysis. Then, linear regressions are utilized to compare the buy-and-hold returns of
celebrity-backed SPACs against those of 311 non-celebrity SPACs that closed deals during the
same period. Overall, I find that there is not a significant difference between the returns of celebrity
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SPACs and non-celebrity SPACs for the SPAC nor deSPAC period. However, my overall results
appear to be consistent with other research papers. These studies find that SPACs generally
generate positive returns for investors during the SPAC period. Subsequently, SPACs generally
generate negative returns for investors during the first year following a business combination.
Descriptive statistics for the study can be found in Table 1, and the results from the linear
regressions can be found in Table 3 of this paper.
The remainder of this paper is divided up into the following sections. Section 2 presents a
literature review on relevant SPAC, celebrity endorsement, stock market, and IPO literature and
provides my hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the data sources, variable definitions, and summary
statistics from my research. Section 4 presents the empirical framework and results of my study.
Section 5 provides concluding remarks, discusses the limitations of this study, and explains the
possibilities for future research.

2. Literature Review and Hypotheses
2.1 SPAC returns
Since 2010, much research has been done to analyze the common equity performance of special
purpose acquisition companies. As these investment vehicles have grown in popularity, the
importance of measuring their returns for investors has also grown. Overall, papers written in the
post-2010 SPAC environment have indicated that SPACs tend to generate positive returns during
the SPAC period. Studies have shown that SPACs generally underperform the overall stock market
in the deSPAC period and produce negative returns for investors.
For the SPAC period, Gahng, Ritter, and Zhang (2022) find equally weighted SPAC period
annualized returns of 12.0% for SPACs that went public from 2010 through 2018. Further, Lin et
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al. (2021) observe annualized buy and hold returns for the SPAC period of 14.12% for SPACs that
complete deals. Within the deSPAC period, Chamberlain (2021) analyzes the long-run common
equity performance of SPACs that closed deals from 2016 to 2018. She finds that the difference
in returns between SPACs and the Nasdaq during this period is statistically significant at the 1%
level. Across the 2016 to 2018 period, the Nasdaq composite index grew 51.50% while SPAC
common equites declined by 32.60%. Gahng, Ritter, and Zhang (2022) find similar results for the
stock performance of companies that complete SPAC deals. In their paper, weighted average oneyear deSPAC returns for common shares are found to be -7.3%, an underperformance to the overall
market by 20.9%. In an examination of 47 SPACs that completed a business combination between
January 2019 and June 2020, Klausner, Ohlrogge, and Ruan (2022) observe mean three-month
post-merger SPAC returns of -2.9% for the merger cohort. For this same cohort, the study finds
that at the six-month and twelve-month post-merger benchmarks SPACs generate mean returns of
-12.3% and -34.9% respectively. However, the study finds that the twenty-four SPACs in the study
that had high-quality sponsors performed better at the three-month benchmark, generating mean
post-merger returns of 31.5%. Thus, these studies indicate that SPACs, on average, generate
positive returns in the SPAC period but generate negative returns for investors in the first year or
two following a business combination.

2.2 General events and trends impacting the SPAC market
Although public markets experienced the SPAC frenzy of 2020 and 2021, the market for these
investments appears to have slowed down. In 2020, a record-shattering 248 SPACs went public
according to SPAC Research. In 2021, that number more than doubled, as 613 SPACs came to
market. However, in the first 9 months of 2022, the number of SPAC IPOs declined, with 78
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SPACs going public. Despite this decline, the IPO market for SPACs is still above the levels
witnessed in 2019, when 59 SPACs went public. The sizable decrease in SPAC IPOs and proceeds
between the 2020/2021 SPAC frenzy and the first nine months of 2022 can likely be attributed to
a number of factors.
One of these factors appears to be increased scrutiny from government entities and
individuals. In March 2022, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed a
variety of new amendments and rules. These suggested policy changes are designed to enhance
disclosure requirements for SPACs and protect investors. If these provisions are enacted, the SEC
argues that the policy changes would more closely align with financial statement reporting
requirements for private operating companies that elect to go public via an initial public offering.
Aside from the SEC’s involvement, U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren has taken issue with the rise
of SPACs. In May 2022, Sen. Warren announced that she would propose a bill designed to enhance
regulations and disclosure requirements for these investment vehicles. Additionally, she released
a document titled: “The SPAC Hack: How SPACs Tilt the Playing Field and Enrich Wall Street
Insiders”. In this presentation, Warren critiques the structure and incentives of SPACs. Given the
heightened scrutiny of the SEC and governmental officials like Senator Warren, it is plausible that
these developments have had a negative impact on private industry’s desire to form SPACs.
Another factor impacting the SPAC market could be economic instability. Since 2020,
many of the world’s economies have experienced supply chain shortages, historically high rates
of inflation, and volatile stock markets. According to Lin et al. (2021), SPACs typically complete
business combinations with young and high-growth companies. As a result, investors may be more
reluctant to pour funds into these investment vehicles in a period of vast economic uncertainty.
However, this assumption could be false. For instance, in the second quarter of 2020, the U.S.
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experienced the largest single-quarter drop in GDP on-record in the nation’s history. Despite this,
in the third quarter of 2020, SPAC issuance remained relatively high in comparison to historical
levels. A total of 248 SPACs went public in 2020, compared to 59 SPACs that went public in the
expansionary economic environment of 2019. Thus, while economic instability could deter SPAC
issuance, the 2020/2021 SPAC frenzy may dispute this notion.

2.3 Celebrity effects on stock prices
The impact of celebrities on stock prices and public company transactions was the subject of much
discussion in 2021 and continued into 2022. As mentioned previously, in October 2021, it was
announced that a SPAC, Digital World Acquisition Company (DWAC), would merge with Trump
Media and Technology Group. As a result, the price of DWAC soared, going from an IPO price
of $10/share in September 2022 to a height of $175 per share in October 2022. Although Trump
was more-so associated with Trump Media and Technology Group instead of DWAC, this event
highlighted the impact that a celebrity could have on SPAC performance. Additionally, we can
examine stock price volatility regarding the possible acquisition of Twitter by Elon Musk. On
April 14, 2022, the billionaire and Tesla executive announced that he would acquire Twitter at a
valuation of about $43 billion. This caused the stock price of Twitter to relatively increase before
Musk asserted that the deal was on hold as of May 13, 2022. As a result, the stock price reversed
course and began trending downward. After months of debate over whether the deal would go
through, Musk completed the acquisition of Twitter in October 2022. Thus, these high-profile
cases demonstrate the stock price volatility that can result from celebrity involvement in a public
company’s affairs.
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Aside from these case studies of 2021 and 2022, some research has been done to analyze
the impact that celebrities can have on the stock performance of companies. For instance, Huang,
Ni, and Yu (2022) find that celebrity endorsements assist in attracting and maintaining investor
attention, resulting in increased short-term stock prices and adverse effects on the financial markets
in the long-term. Shiva, Arora, and Rishi (2022) note that investors prefer to invest in a technology
company that is endorsed by an entertainment celebrity as opposed to by a sports celebrity. Prentice
and Zhang (2017) mention that a celebrity endorsement that aligns with the celebrity’s profession
is associated with better stock returns. On the other hand, some studies have concluded that
celebrity endorsements do not have an extensive effect on stock prices or the stock selection
decisions of investors. For instance, Ding, Molchanov, and Stork (2010) find that companies that
announce celebrity endorsements do not achieve positive abnormal returns. Agrawal and
Kamakura (1995) find similar results. Their paper asserts that, on average, the market reacts
positively in the 2-day window following a celebrity endorsement. After this time window, the
findings suggest that there is not a significant celebrity endorsement effect on stock returns.
Overall, previous studies indicate that celebrity endorsements could affect the companies that
investors decide to invest in and the stock performance of these companies. However, celebrity
endorsements may only have a short-term impact on stock performance.

2.4 Hypotheses
Through my research, I expect to find that celebrity-backed SPACs overperform the general SPAC
market during the SPAC period. My reasoning for this is because an investor may decide to
initially invest in a SPAC due to the individuals associated with it. The announcement of celebrity
sponsorship or backing of a SPAC could generate significant interest among retail investors,
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helping to boost the price of those SPAC shares circulating in the market. Large institutional
investors may also buy up pre-merger shares of celebrity-backed SPACs in an effort to take
advantage of this likely heightened interest in celebrity sponsorship. Therefore, the first hypothesis
examined in this study is as follows:
H0: 𝑦𝑆𝑃𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 ≤ 𝑦𝑆𝑃𝐴𝐶𝑁𝑜𝑛−𝐶𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦
H1: 𝑦𝑆𝑃𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 > 𝑦𝑆𝑃𝐴𝐶𝑁𝑜𝑛−𝐶𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦
where 𝑦𝑆𝑃𝐴𝐶 represents the annualized SPAC period return as of the business combination
date.

For my second hypothesis, I expect to find that celebrity-backed SPACs underperform the
general SPAC market during the deSPAC period. This is largely the result of the first hypothesis
presented. Once a business combination is completed, the share prices of celebrity SPACs will
likely experience large declines in value because of the heightened retail investor interest that
occurred in the SPAC period. Generally, I expect enthusiasm for a celebrity’s sponsorship of a
specific SPAC to fade over time as retail investors become skeptical of the celebrity’s ability to
pick the best companies to go public. Institutional investors may also begin selling off shares in
the newly merged company to minimize possible losses. Thus, the second hypothesis examined in
this paper is as follows:
H0: 𝑦𝑖 𝑑𝑒𝑆𝑃𝐴𝐶

≥ 𝑦𝑖 𝑑𝑒𝑆𝑃𝐴𝐶

H1: 𝑦𝑖 𝑑𝑒𝑆𝑃𝐴𝐶

< 𝑦𝑖 𝑑𝑒𝑆𝑃𝐴𝐶

𝐶𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦

𝐶𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦

𝑁𝑜𝑛−𝐶𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦

𝑁𝑜𝑛−𝐶𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦

where 𝑦𝑖 𝑑𝑒𝑆𝑃𝐴𝐶 represents the deSPAC common share return generated between the date
of business combination and time interval 𝑖.
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3. Data Sources, Sample Construction, and Summary Statistics
3.1 Data sources
I utilize several sources to obtain data for my analyses. First, I collect information from SPAC
Research, a commercial SPAC database. In my study, I utilize SPAC Research to gather
information regarding SPAC names, respective post-merger company names, ticker symbols, IPO
and deal close dates, IPO price data, deal statuses, IPO proceeds, and PIPE financing amounts.
Second, I hand collect historical price data from Yahoo Finance as applicable to each
SPAC. On this platform, I hand-collect price data at the business combination date and at certain
benchmarks in the deSPAC period. For the deSPAC period, I obtain price data for the date
following a business combination and at the 3-month and 1-year intervals from when a business
combination occurred. Returns are based upon adjusted close prices instead of close prices. Since
adjusted close prices account for certain events, such as stock dividends and stock splits, I perceive
this to be a better indicator of the change in value of a SPAC. Due to limitations in the data
available on Yahoo Finance, some modifications are employed in the collection of data. First,
information available from my thesis director and second reader – Siwen Zhang and Donghang
Zhang – are referenced to fill in pricing information gaps for select companies. Second, for missing
price data that is not available from my colleagues at the University of South Carolina, Bloomberg
is utilized to hand collect pricing data. Upon performing these two methods to obtain missing price
data, I have the stock price data necessary to generate common share returns.
This analysis includes several control variables to account for various differences between
SPACs. These controls are created using data available from SPAC Research and from data
provided by my thesis director and second reader. The first control variable in my study controls
for the size of a SPAC’s IPO. The data for this variable was directly collected from SPAC
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Research. The second control variable controls for the amount of private investment in public
equity (PIPE) financing that a SPAC receives. For SPAC deals that closed between July 29, 2016
and September 30, 2021, my thesis director and second reader investigated public filings to obtain
PIPE financing details. PIPE data from their investigation that corresponds to my study is utilized.
Because some SPACs in the sample for my first analysis fall outside of the timeframe of my
colleagues’ research, I utilize SPAC Research to obtain PIPE financing details for any remaining
PIPE information needed. Finally, the third control variable controls for the amount of time that it
takes for a SPAC to complete a business combination. This is calculated for each SPAC by
calculating the length of time between the SPAC IPO and the business combination dates provided
by SPAC Research.
Although this study includes control variables, it still suffers from omitted variable bias.
Industry-specific stock price fluctuations, redemption ratios, general market sentiment, and real
economic conditions are some examples of variables that could affect the results of this study if
they were to be employed in the analysis. Future research should include additional variables when
measuring the impact of celebrities on special purpose acquisition company performance in the
common equity markets.

3.2 Sample Construction
To collect data for my analysis, I begin by obtaining information regarding SPACs that went public
since 2015 from SPAC Research. To determine which SPACs in this sample should be considered
celebrity SPACs, I reference an article published from the Wall Street Journal titled “The
Celebrities From Serena Williams to A-Rod Fueling the SPAC Boom” (Ramkumar, 2021). The
article discusses the phenomenon of celebrities becoming involved in special purpose acquisition
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companies and provides a lengthy list of SPACs and the celebrities that are associated with each
one. By determining celebrity status in this manner, the SPACs that are identified as celebrity
SPACs for my analysis are largely the result of editor judgment at the Wall Street Journal.
However, aside from the celebrity SPACs mentioned in the Wall Street Journal article, I add other
SPACs to the sample that I deem relevant. To do this, I perform a sponsor search in the SPAC
Research database of all individuals listed in the Wall Street Journal article. If a SPAC
management team on SPAC Research includes an individual listed in the Wall Street Journal
article, the corresponding SPAC is added to my analysis if it is not already included.
After reviewing the article and performing the sponsor search, I determine that 66 of the
SPACs in the sample, regardless of deal status, can be considered celebrity-backed. A list of the
identified celebrity SPACs, their applicable post-merger companies, associated celebrities, and
deal statuses can be found in Table 4. Upon determining which celebrity SPACs have closed deals,
I limit my comparison study between celebrity SPAC and non-celebrity SPACs to the timeframe
in which the identified celebrity SPACs have closed deals. For this paper, the earliest closed
celebrity SPAC deal occurred on November 30, 2017 and the most recent one occurred on March
17, 2022. Thus, the analysis in this paper focuses on SPACs that closed deals from November 30,
2017 to March 17, 2022. In total, 339 SPACs that have closed deals are studied. Of these, I identify
28 as being celebrity SPACs, and 311 are not celebrity SPACs. To examine the most prevalent
types of celebrities that sponsor SPACs, I separate celebrities into four categories as listed by the
Wall Street Journal: Athletes, Singers and Other Pop-Culture Figures, Political Figures, and
Business and Finance Figures. In addition, to get an understanding of when the most celebritybacked SPAC deals occurred, I compile this information as well. Table 2 displays the categorical
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make-up of the celebrity-backed SPACs that have closed deals, as well as the number of closed
celebrity SPAC deals by year.
There are a few points that may cause contention with the analysis of this paper. First, the
word “celebrity” is a subjective term, so one person’s definition of what a celebrity is will be
inherently different from another person’s viewpoint of what a celebrity is. Within the field of
finance, individuals that could be considered celebrities may differ from the individuals that should
be considered celebrities to the broader society. For example, a CEO of a major U.S. bank is likely
to have a larger following amongst those who follow financial news in comparison to the general
population. Next, there may be SPACs that have celebrity involvement that have been left out of
the Wall Street Journal’s article. To help combat possible omission of other celebrity SPACs, I
include some SPACs that are not explicitly mentioned in the article, as mentioned previously.
Aside from this, SPACs within the data set may have initially had celebrity involvement in them
but the involvement ended sometime before a business combination could occur. As a result, my
findings may be skewed due to fluctuations that this could have caused to the data. Despite this,
the presence and subsequent absence of the celebrity may provide an outlet into the sheer volatility
of the SPAC market. Last, some SPACs within the data set may not have initially had celebrity
involvement, but a celebrity became involved with the SPAC sometime later in the lifecycle. This
could also skew the results. Despite the risks listed above, I believe that this analysis provides a
useful outlet into the effect that celebrities can have on the SPAC process and stock price returns.

3.3 Summary Statistics
Table 1 displays the summary statistics for my study. Panel A shows the characteristics of all 339
SPACs included in my analysis. The mean and median annualized SPAC period returns are 34.0%
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and 2.2%, respectively. This indicates that the SPAC period returns are skewed. The mean
deSPAC period returns at the one-day, three-month, and one-year intervals are found to be 1.3%,
-12.5%, and -39.3%, respectively. It is interesting to note that the three-month and one-year median
deSPAC returns are lower than the mean returns at these intervals, indicating that the deSPAC
returns are also skewed. At the three-month interval, a mean return of -12.5% is found in
comparison with a median return of -17.5%. At the one-year interval, a mean return of -39.3% is
found in comparison to a median return of -60.1%. The minimum one-day return is -63.9% and
the maximum one-day return is 257.6%, indicating the volatility that can occur around a deal close.
The average IPO proceeds is $297.82 million, the average deal length is 464 days, and the average
amount of PIPE financing utilized by a SPAC is $241.481 million. Of the 339 SPACs included in
my analysis, 8.3% of them are celebrity-backed.
Panel B displays statistics for the SPACs in my study that are determined as being celebritybacked. The respective mean and median annualized SPAC period returns are 43.8% and 7.8%,
indicating skewness in the returns. The mean deSPAC returns at the one-day, three-month, and
one-year intervals for these equities are found to be 5.5%, -16.3%, and -51.9%, respectively. The
median returns at these respective intervals are -0.6%, -17.5%, and -60.1%. These returns appear
to be less skewed than non-celebrity SPACs. I find an average PIPE amount of $584.429 million
for celebrity SPACs. Additionally, the average deal length is 393 days, and the average amount of
IPO proceeds is $597.107 million. 60.71% of closed celebrity SPAC deals occurred in 2021.
Panel C shows the statistics for non-celebrity SPACs included in my analysis. The
respective mean and median annualized SPAC period returns are 33.1% and 2.1%, indicating
skewness in these returns. The mean deSPAC period returns for non-celebrity backed SPACs at
the one-day, three-month, and one-year interval are 0.09%, -12.1%, and -38.0%, respectively. The
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median returns at these respective intervals are -0.08%, -17.5%, and -59.8%. Although there
appears to be skewness in the returns, these figures indicate that deSPAC returns become more
negative throughout the first year following a business combination. The average IPO proceeds is
$270.875 million, the average PIPE amount is $210.605, and the average deal length is 470 days.

4. Empirical Framework and Results
4.1.1 Empirical Framework
Given the nature of SPACs, prior to a deal announcement, investors are uncertain over what they
are buying into. As a result, a heightened importance may be placed on sponsor boards and the
individuals associated with a SPAC in order for someone to determine which SPAC to invest in.
Some individuals that could make a SPAC stand out amongst its competitors are celebrities.
Because celebrities may have enhanced sponsor networks and business connections compared to
other sponsors and individuals associated with SPACs, this could drive improved share
performance. In another paper, Lin et al. (2021) study the impact of Private Equity (PE) network
centrality on various aspects of SPACs and SPAC performance. Their study finds that SPACs
with higher PE network centrality generate better long-term stock returns following business
combinations than those with lower PE network centrality. Given these results, it will be
interesting to see in my study whether celebrity association with SPACs has an impact on the
SPAC or deSPAC period performance of these equities.
If investors believe a certain celebrity or group of celebrities involved with a SPAC can
help facilitate a deal that will generate abnormally positive returns for shareholders, this could
drive fluctuations in the price of the SPAC during both the SPAC and deSPAC period. During
the SPAC period, I expect celebrity SPACs to outperform their non-celebrity counterparts
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because of retail investors’ belief in the ability of celebrities to facilitate abnormally positive
deals. After a deal is complete, I expect celebrity-backed SPACs to underperform non-celebritybacked SPACs. The heightened SPAC period price, combined with subsequent doubts about the
ability of celebrities to produce value-generating deals, could likely drive a decline in stock
prices and retail investor interest in the deSPAC period. Additionally, institutional investors may
begin disposing of shares around the deal close to take advantage of the heightened price while
minimizing the risk associated with maintaining a stake in the newly merged company.
My approach to analyze how celebrity-backed SPACs perform in comparison to the
overall SPAC market is to conduct a multiple linear regression at four separate intervals. The
first interval chosen analyzes the annualized SPAC period return for each SPAC. This interval
measures the return generated by a SPAC as of the date of business combination. The other three
intervals chosen analyze the deSPAC period returns for each SPAC from the date of business
combination. These intervals are as follows: the next trading day that occurs after the close of a
business combination, three months after the close of a business combination, and one year after
the close of a business combination. The SPAC period return is analyzed to determine whether
celebrity SPACs experience an abnormal increase in share price during the SPAC period in
comparison to non-celebrity SPACs. Next, the one-day deSPAC interval is selected for analysis
because a celebrity SPAC could experience an additional pop in price following a business
combination. Around a business combination, investors could have heightened enthusiasm about
the celebrity’s ability to help generate positive returns for the company’s stock. The analysis of
the three-month and one-year deSPAC intervals is to align with other papers that have
investigated returns in the SPAC market. This will enable me to compare my findings with those
of other researchers.
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4.1.2 Linear Regression Model for SPAC and deSPAC Returns
For both the SPAC and deSPAC period analyses, I perform a multiple linear regression in
Microsoft Excel. Four independent variables are included in my model. The dependent variable
in the model is the common share return at interval 𝑖. The resulting statistics from these
regressions are shown in Table 3.
To investigate my hypotheses, I begin by obtaining the annualized SPAC period returns
of 339 SPACs as of the date of business combination, assuming a buy-and-hold investment
strategy. To calculate the annualized SPAC period return, I first obtain the cumulative SPAC
period return:
𝑃𝐶𝐷 − 𝑃𝐼𝑃𝑂
× 100 = 𝐶𝑅𝐶𝐷
𝑃𝐼𝑃𝑂
where 𝑃𝐼𝑃𝑂 represents the share price at the IPO date, 𝑃𝐶𝐷 is the share price at the business
combination date, and 𝐶𝑅𝐶𝐷 is the cumulative SPAC period return as of the business
combination date.
I then utilize 𝑅𝐶𝐷 to find the annualized SPAC period return for each SPAC, assuming a
buy-and-hold investment strategy. To calculate the annualized SPAC period return, the following
equation is employed:
365

(1 + 𝐶𝑅𝐶𝐷 )𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ − 1 = 𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐷
where DealLength represents the length between the IPO date and the business combination date
and 𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐷 represents the annualized SPAC period return as of the business combination date.
After calculating the annualized SPAC period returns, I obtain the deSPAC returns of 339
SPACs at three intervals mentioned previously, assuming a buy-and-hold investment strategy.
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To calculate the returns for the SPACs in the sample at each of the deSPAC intervals given, the
following equation is employed:
𝑃𝐼𝐷 − 𝑃𝐶𝐷
× 100 = 𝑅𝐼𝐷
𝑃𝐶𝐷
where 𝑃𝐶𝐷 is the share price at the business combination date, 𝑃𝐼𝐷 is the share price at the
specified interval date, and 𝑅𝐼𝐷 is the return given as of the specified interval date.
After determining the SPAC and deSPAC period returns, I generate the independent
variables for my study. The first is a dummy variable for celebrity status, where a value of 1
indicates celebrity-backing of the SPAC and a value of 0 indicates no celebrity involvement.
Because SPAC performance may also be impacted by other factors, I include three other
independent variables as controls to capture the potential effects of these components. These
independent variables measure IPO proceeds, the amount of PIPE financing, and deal length for
each SPAC in the study. After obtaining returns and collecting the values needed for the
independent variables, I run the regressions. The equation for the regression model is given as
follows:
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐶𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2 𝐼𝑃𝑂 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑠 + 𝛽3 𝑃𝐼𝑃𝐸 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡
+ 𝛽4 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ + 𝜀
where 𝑦𝑖 represents the common share return at interval 𝑖.
To interpret the findings of this model, I will determine which values are of significance.
To determine statistical significance, I utilize the p-values generated from the model. At the 1%,
5%, and 10% confidence levels, respective p-values of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 are compared against
the p-values generated in my model. After identifying which variables are significant in the
model, I interpret the sign of each coefficient to determine its relationship to the common share
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returns. By providing this analysis, I can help investors make more informed decisions when
considering investing in the SPAC market.

4.2 Empirical Results
In this section, I present the results of the multiple linear regression model shown in Table 3. For
all four panels, the celebrity dummy variable is utilized as the key independent variable. To
determine whether there is a significant celebrity effect at any of the four intervals studied, I
examine the p-values generated from the regression model. After controlling for IPO size, PIPE
financing, and deal length, all four regressions show a statistically insignificant effect from
celebrity involvement in a SPAC. Therefore, this study fails to reject the first null hypothesis that
celebrity SPACs generate equivalent or lower returns than the general SPAC market in the SPAC
period. Moreover, this study fails to reject the second null hypothesis that celebrity SPACs
generate equivalent or better returns than the general SPAC market in the deSPAC period.
Within Table 3, Panel A displays the annualized SPAC period returns for 339 SPACs that
closed deals. An insignificant celebrity effect on SPAC period performance of -0.056 is found,
indicating that celebrity involvement in a SPAC does not push up prices in the period leading up
to a business combination. Additionally, IPO proceeds, PIPE amount, and deal length are not
found to have a statistically significant effect on SPAC period performance. The r-squared of
0.009 indicates that most of the variation in stock price returns cannot be explained by the
variables included in the model. When including all four independent variables in the model, an
𝛼 of 0.583 is found. This value is statistically significant at the 10% level. This means that,
before considering the effects of other variables, a SPAC is expected to generate a SPAC period
return of 58.3%.

24

Within Table 3, Panel B examines the one-day deSPAC returns for 339 SPACs. This
panel shows an insignificant celebrity effect on deSPAC performance on the first day following a
business combination of 0.060. This indicates that celebrity involvement with a SPAC does not
cause a spike in prices following a business combination. Moreover, IPO proceeds, PIPE
amount, and deal length are also found to not have a statistically significant effect on the one-day
deSPAC performance. A statistically insignificant 𝛼 of 0.016 is found, and the r-squared of
0.006 indicates that most of the variation in the one-day returns is not explained by the
independent variables included in the model.
Panel C displays the results of the regression for the three-month deSPAC returns of 339
SPACs. Like Panel B, this panel finds a statistically insignificant effect for each of the four
independent variables included in the model. Although a celebrity effect of -0.078 is found, this
value is statistically insignificant. Furthermore, based on the r-squared of 0.005, the independent
variables included in this model do not explain much of the variation in the three-month deSPAC
returns. These results show that all four independent variables likely do not have an influence on
the common share deSPAC returns of SPACs. However, the 𝛼 of -0.145 at this interval is
statistically significant at the 1% level. This means that the expected return at the three-month
benchmark, before considering other variables, is -14.5%. Thus, I infer that SPACs are expected
to generate negative returns by the three-month interval following a business combination.
In Panel D, I present my regression of one-year common share deSPAC returns. Due to
the date range for my study, fewer closed deals are examined in this regression. This results in a
sample size of 268 SPACs. Similar to the findings of Panels A, B and C, a statistically
insignificant celebrity effect is found. While the celebrity effect of -0.152 is not statistically
significant, it is interesting that this value decreases over time when comparing it with Panels B
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and C. Aside from examining the celebrity effect, IPO proceeds, PIPE financing, and deal length
are also found to be statistically insignificant over time. Each of these is found to have a
statistically insignificant effect of 0.000 on deSPAC common share performance. The r-squared
is found to be 0.006, so most of the variation in common share returns at the one-year interval
cannot be explained by the independent variables included in the regression. Like Panel C, Panel
D shows a statistically significant 𝛼 at the 1% level. The 𝛼 of -0.457 indicates that SPACs are
expected to generate returns of -45.7% for the first year following a business combination before
considering other factors.
Although the independent variables included in my study explain a small percentage of
the variation in common share performance, the 𝛼 values found for the SPAC period, threemonth deSPAC, and one-year deSPAC intervals provide for interesting discussion. Regardless of
celebrity status, my study finds that SPACs are expected to generate positive returns in the SPAC
period. This finding is consistent with other studies. Gahng, Ritter, and Zhang (2022) and Lin et
al. (2021) observe positive annualized buy-and-hold returns for the SPAC period. Next, my study
finds that SPACs are expected to generate negative returns during the first year following a deal
close. On the date following a business combination, a non-statistically significant constant of
positive 1.6% is found. However, for the three-month interval following a business combination,
I find an 𝛼 of -0.145 which is statistically significant at the 1% level. For the one-year interval
after a deal close, I find an 𝛼 of -0.457 that is statistically significant at the 1% level. This
indicates that, at least during the first year of trading, it is expected for the share prices of
deSPAC companies to decline over time. These findings appear to be consistent with those found
in other papers. Klausner, Ohlrogge, and Ruan (2022) find mean negative returns for SPACs at
the three-month and one-year intervals to be -2.9% and -12.3%, respectively. Moreover, Gahng,
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Ritter, and Zhang (2022) find the average one-year equally weighted deSPAC period common
share returns to be -7.3%. In a study of 71 firms, Dimitrova (2017) observes the mean return at
the one-year deSPAC interval to be -41.0%. Given the findings of this paper and of others,
investors should consider the risks associated with implementing a buy-and-hold strategy for a
SPAC, whether it is backed by a celebrity or not.
Given the observations found at each of the three intervals studied, future research
surrounding the topic of celebrity SPACs should include more independent variables to discover
what factors affect the common share performance of SPACs that have closed deals. For
instance, Gahng, Ritter, and Zhang (2022) find that increased redemption ratios and deals that
occur closer to a SPAC’s business combination deadline predict lower deSPAC period returns.
Dimitrova (2017) finds that long-run SPAC returns are 57 percentage points higher when a
SPAC sponsor is appointed as a chairman of the merged company. Finally, Lin et al. (2021)
highlight the importance of a SPAC’s PE/Venture Capital (VC) network to its performance in the
market. The inclusion of factors such as these in a future study may help better explain what can
drive common share performance amongst SPACs.

5. Conclusions
This paper examines the influence of celebrity involvement on SPAC common share
performance. SPAC period returns are analyzed, along with deSPAC period returns in the year
following a business combination. My results fail to reject the null hypothesis that celebrity
SPACs generate equivalent or lower returns than the general SPAC market in the SPAC period.
Further, the results of my study fail to reject the null hypothesis that celebrity SPACs generate
similar or greater deSPAC returns than non-celebrity SPACs. These results seem consistent with
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papers such as Ding, Molchanov, and Stork (2010) and Agrawal and Kamakura (1995), which
find that celebrity involvements do not result in abnormally positive returns for investors. While
Lin et al. (2021) determine that PE/VC network centrality can be crucial to a SPAC’s returns,
this study indicates that celebrity fame might not contribute to a SPAC’s performance. Although
this study illustrates that celebrity SPACs do not perform significantly differently than the
general SPAC market, it raises the question as to how important the credibility and expertise of
individuals associated with a SPAC are to retail and institutional investors. Additionally, while
not the central focus of this study, I find that IPO sizes, PIPE financing amounts, and deal length
do not appear to have a significant effect on a SPAC’s performance. However, my results
indicate that the returns of SPACs within the first year following a business combination are
generally negative for shareholders that follow a buy-and-hold investment strategy. Therefore,
before investing in a SPAC, investors should ascertain some level of confidence over a sponsor
team’s ability to select a viable and value-generating target company to merge with.
Within my study, only 6 out of 28 of the celebrity SPACs studied have at least one
celebrity that is not considered a business or finance celebrity. As the SPAC market continues to
evolve, it will be interesting to see whether closed celebrity SPAC deals further diversify beyond
the ubiquitousness of the business and finance celebrity category. Given recent macroeconomic
developments and the possible tightening of SEC regulations on SPACs, it may be more difficult
in the near-term for more celebrities to get involved with these investment vehicles. Despite
these headwinds, if SPACs continue to be in the mainstream of financial discussion, celebrity
involvement with these equities may become more commonplace and diverse.
Although this study utilizes multiple control variables to alleviate endogeneity concerns,
the independent variables included in this study do not explain a large percentage of the
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deviation in the common share returns. Future studies should identify a wider variety of factors
that may influence common share returns. Moreover, given the relative infancy of celebrity
involvement in the SPAC market, future studies should include a larger sample of celebritybacked SPACs to obtain a more accurate picture of how celebrities can impact stock
performance. Some examples of future research in this area could involve studying whether
celebrity involvement with a SPAC has a larger effect on common share performance than
celebrity involvement with a company that went public via a traditional IPO or direct listing.
Future studies could also examine whether there is a celebrity involvement effect beyond the
one-year interval following a business combination for a SPAC.
Despite the limitations presented, findings in other pieces of literature appear to be
consistent with the results of this study. Although celebrity-backed SPACs do not underperform
the general SPAC market in the long-run, it does not appear that they overperform the market
either. Thus, when deciding whether to invest in a SPAC that is backed by a celebrity, it may be
worth considering whether the investment is worth the hype.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
This table shows the summary statistics for the variables used in my analysis. The sample includes 339 closed SPAC
deals that occurred between November 30, 2017 and March 17, 2022. Since some SPACs in the analysis have not
been in the deSPAC phase for a year or more, the sample size for the 1-year deSPAC return variable includes 268
SPAC deals. IPO proceeds, IPO dates, deal closing dates, and PIPE amounts are collected from SPAC Research. Stock
prices are hand-collected from Yahoo Finance and Bloomberg. Certain pieces of stock price and PIPE amount data
are provided by two colleagues at the Darla Moore School of Business. For the Celebrity variable, a value of 0 indicates
that a SPAC is not backed by a celebrity while a value of 1 indicates celebrity involvement with a SPAC.

IPO proceeds
PIPE amount
Deal length
SPAC period return
1-day deSPAC return
3-mnth deSPAC return
1-year deSPAC return
Celebrity Dummy

N
339
339
339
339
339
339
268
339

Mean
297.820
241.481
464.000
0.340
0.013
-0.125
-0.393
0.083

Panel A: All SPACs
Min
25%
39
173
0
50
144
293
-0.452
-0.062
-0.639
-0.056
-0.890
-0.355
-0.997
-0.778
0

SD
227.800
378.676
0.330
0.114
0.206
0.445
0.630
0.276

Median
253
150
378
0.022
-0.006
-0.175
-0.601

75%
345
275
603
0.187
0.048
0.017
-0.187

Max
2,070
4,040
1,307
36.494
2.576
3.537
3.188
1

75%
776
784
521
0.514
0.075
-0.022
-0.296

Max
2,070
2,600
903
4.406
0.860
0.490
0.687

75%
345
250
621
0.177
0.045
0.025
-0.168

Max
1,725
4,040
1,307
36.494
2.576
3.537
3.188

IPO proceeds
PIPE amount
Deal length
SPAC period return
1-day deSPAC return
3-mnth deSPAC return
1-year deSPAC return

N
28
28
28
28
28
28
24

Mean
597.107
584.429
392.679
0.438
0.055
-0.163
-0.519

SD
422.219
736.052
187.642
0.177
0.173
0.283
0.440

Panel B: Celebrity SPACs
Min
25%
Median
195
299
492
0
123
275
202
240
327
-0.186
-0.024
0.078
-0.115
-0.009
0.012
-0.703
-0.329
-0.170
-0.997
-0.804
-0.623

IPO proceeds
PIPE amount
Deal length
SPAC period return
1-day deSPAC return
3-mnth deSPAC return
1-year deSPAC return

N
311
311
311
311
311
311
244

Mean
270.875
210.605
469.862
0.331
0.009
-0.121
-0.380

SD
179.540
312.380
233.274
0.124
0.208
0.457
0.645

Panel C: Non-Celebrity SPACs
Min
25%
Median
39
155
250
0
48
142
144
301
383
-0.452
-0.067
0.021
-0.639
-0.056
-0.008
-0.890
-0.357
-0.175
-0.997
-0.765
-0.598
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Table 2: Celebrity SPAC Profile
This table displays the categorical make-up of closed celebrity SPAC deals that are included in the sample and the
number of celebrity SPACs that closed deals by year. It is important to note that some celebrity SPACs fall into more
than one category, explaining why the total number of associated SPACs by category in Panel A is greater than the
number of celebrity SPACs in the sample. The period of closed deals examined for 2022 ends on March 17, 2022,
which helps explain some of the decline in closed celebrity SPACs from 2021 to 2022.
Panel A: Categorical Make-Up of Closed Deals
Type of Celebrity SPAC
# of Associated SPACs
Athletes
3
Singers and Other Pop-Culture Figures
2
Political Figures
1
Business and Finance Figures
25

Panel B: Closed Celebrity SPACs by Year
Year
# of SPACs
2017
1
2018
1
2019
3
2020
4
2021
17
2022
2
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Table 3: SPAC and deSPAC Period Performance
This table presents the regression results that estimate the effect of celebrity-backing on SPAC performance. These
regressions are performed in Microsoft Excel. Panel A presents the annualized SPAC period returns while Panels B
through D display the deSPAC period returns. All returns assume a buy-and-hold investment strategy. The
independent variables utilized are a dummy variable for celebrity status, the amount of IPO proceeds for a SPAC,
the amount of PIPE financing utilized by a SPAC, and the amount of time it took for a SPAC to complete a business
combination. For the celebrity dummy variable, a value of 0 indicates that the SPAC is not celebrity-backed while a
value of 1 indicates celebrity-backing. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **,
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.

Dependent Variable:
Celebrity Dummy
IPO Proceeds
PIPE Amount

Panel A: Annualized SPAC period returns
(1)
(2)
(3)
SPAC period
SPAC period
SPAC period
return
return
return
0.107
-0.052
-0.050
(0.416)
(0.453)
(0.454)
0.000
0.001
(0.001)
(0.001)
0.000
(0.000)

Deal Length

Constant
Obs
R-Squared

Dependent Variable:
Celebrity Dummy

0.331***
(0.120)
339
0.000

0.199
(0.191)
339
0.003

0.196
(0.192)
339
0.003

Panel B: One-day deSPAC returns
(1)
(2)
(3)
1-day return
1-day return
1-day return

(4)
1-day return

0.060
(0.044)
0.000
(0.000)

0.060
(0.044)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)

0.060
(0.044)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)

0.009
(0.012)
339
0.004

0.021
(0.019)
339
0.006

0.021
(0.019)
339
0.006

0.016
(0.032)
339
0.006

PIPE Amount
Deal Length

Obs
R-Squared

0.583*
(0.327)
339
0.009

0.046
(0.041)

IPO Proceeds

Constant

(4)
SPAC period
return
-0.056
(0.453)
0.000
(0.001)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.001)
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Dependent Variable:
Celebrity Dummy
IPO Proceeds
PIPE Amount

Panel C: Three-month deSPAC returns
(1)
(2)
(3)
3-month return
3-month return
3-month return
-0.041
-0.081
-0.078
(0.088)
(0.096)
(0.096)
0.000
0.000
(0.000)
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)

Deal Length

Constant
Obs
R-Squared

Dependent Variable:
Celebrity Dummy
IPO Proceeds
PIPE Amount

-0.121**
(0.025)
339
0.001

-0.154***
(0.040)
339
0.004

-0.157***
(0.041)
339
0.005

Panel D: One-year deSPAC returns
(1)
(2)
(3)
1-year return
1-year return
1-year return
-0.138
-0.153
-0.156
(0.135)
(0.149)
(0.150)
0.000
0.000
(0.000)
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)

Deal Length

Constant
Obs
R-Squared

-0.380***
(0.040)
268
0.004

-0.391***
(0.061)
268
0.004
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-0.390***
(0.062)
268
0.004

(4)
3-month return
-0.078
(0.096)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.145***
(0.069)
339
0.005

(4)
1-year return
-0.152
(0.150)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.457***
(0.108)
268
0.006

Table 4: Celebrity SPACs and Statuses
This table includes a list of celebrities and their associated SPACs considered for analysis in my study as of March
17, 2022. To begin, this list is created by reviewing a Wall Street Journal article, titled “The Celebrities From Serena
Williams to A-Rod Fueling the SPAC Boom”, for celebrities and their associated SPACs. I then perform a sponsor
search in SPAC Research based upon the celebrities mentioned in the Wall Street Journal article. After reviewing
each SPAC’s respective deal status as of March 17, 2022, only the closed deals are analyzed to obtain returns for my
analyses.
Celebrities

Celebrity SPAC

Post-Merger Company
(if applicable)

Status

Shaquille O’Neal
Serena Williams
Peyton Manning, Andre Agassi, Steffi Graf,
Joe Torre, Theo Epstein

Forest Road Acquisition
Jaws Spitfire Acq
NewHold

Beachbody
Velo3D
Evolv Technology

Closed
Closed
Closed

Jay-Z
Joanna Coles, Jon Ledecky
Peter Thiel
Richard Branson
Richard Branson, Chamath Palihapitiya
Daniel Och, Kevin Systrom, Steve Ells
Michael Klein
Michael Klein
Michael Klein
Michael Klein
Chamath Palihapitiya
Chamath Palihapitiya
Chamath Palihapitiya
Tilman Fertitta
Tilman Fertitta
Tilman Fertitta
Vivek Ranadivé
Tom Ricketts
Bill Foley
Bill Foley
Bill Foley
Jon Ledecky
Jon Ledecky
Ron Burkle
John Delaney
Bill Foley
Stephen Curry
Ciara, Peter Gruber
Gary Cohn

Subversive Capital Acq*
Northern Star
Bridgetown 2
VG Acq
Social Capital
Ajax I
Churchill Capital
Churchill III
Churchill II
Churchill IV
Social Capital II
Social Capital III
Social Capital V
Landcadia III
Landcadia I
Landcadia II
BowX Acquisition
Marquee Raine Acq
Foley Trasimene Acq
Foley Trasimene II
Trebia Acq
Pivotal Acq
Pivotal II
Yucaipa Acquisition
Revolution Acceleration
CF Corp
Dune Acquisition
Bright Lights Acq
Cohn Robbins

TPCO Holding Corp.
BARK
PropertyGuru
23andMe
Virgin Galactic
Cazoo
Clarivate
MultiPlan
Skillsoft
Lucid Motors
Opendoor
Clover Health
SoFi
The Hillman Group
Waitr
Golden Nugget Online Gaming
WeWork
Enjoy Technology
Alight Solutions
Paysafe
System1
KLDiscovery
XL Fleet
SIGNA Sports United
Berkshire Grey
FGL

Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Live-Deal
Live-Deal
Live-Deal
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Danny Meyer
Chamath Palihapitiya
Chamath Palihapitiya
Shaquille O’Neal
Alex Rodriguez
Colin Kaepernick
Patrick Mahomes, Justin Verlander, Naomi
Osaka, Saul “Canelo” Alvarez, Robert
Lewandowski

USHG Acq
Social Capital Suvretta I
Social Capital Suvretta III
Forest Road II
Slam Corp.
Mission Advancement
Disruptive Acq Corp I

Joanna Coles, Jon Ledecky
Northern Star II
Paul Ryan
Executive Network
Wilbur Ross, Larry Kudlow
Ross Acquisition II
Lloyd Austin
Pine Island Acq
Peter Thiel
Bridgetown
Bill Ackman, Michael Ovitz
Pershing Square Tontine
Sam Zell
Equity Distribution Acq
Michael Klein
Churchill Capital V
Michael Klein
Churchill VI
Michael Klein
Churchill VII
Billy Beane
RedBall Acquisition
Chamath Palihapitiya
Social Capital IV
Chamath Palihapitiya
Social Capital VI
Tilman Fertitta
Landcadia IV
Chamath Palihapitiya
Social Capital Suvretta II
Chamath Palihapitiya
Social Capital Suvretta IV
Bill Foley
Austerlitz Acquisition II
Bill Foley
Austerlitz Acquisition I
Joanna Coles, Jon Ledecky
Northern Star III
Joanna Coles, Jon Ledecky
Northern Star IV
Jon Ledecky
Pivotal Investment III
Terry Pegula
East Resources Acquisition
Michael Klein
AltC Acq Corp.
Theo Epstein
Arctos NorthStar Acq
Roger Staubach, Sammy Hagar
Victory Acquisition
John Delaney
Revolution Acceleration II
Vivek Ranadivé
B Capital Technology Corp
*Note: Subversive Capital Acq is excluded from my analysis due to inabilities to collect information
regarding the SPAC from SPAC Research.
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Live-Deal
Live-Deal
Live-Deal
Pre-Deal
Pre-Deal
Pre-Deal
Pre-Deal

Pre-Deal
Pre-Deal
Pre-Deal
Pre-Deal
Pre-Deal
Pre-Deal
Pre-Deal
Pre-Deal
Pre-Deal
Pre-Deal
Pre-Deal
Pre-Deal
Pre-Deal
Pre-Deal
Pre-Deal
Pre-Deal
Pre-Deal
Pre-Deal
Pre-Deal
Pre-Deal
Pre-Deal
Pre-Deal
Pre-Deal
Pre-Deal
Pre-Deal
Pre-IPO
Pre-IPO

Figure 1: SPAC IPO Issuance and Proceeds
This figure displays the number of U.S. SPACs that went public in 2017 through 2021, along with the first three
quarters of 2022. In addition, the respective total yearly SPAC IPO proceeds are shown. Data provided from SPAC
Research is used to create the graphs shown.
Panel A: U.S. SPAC IPO Issuance by Year

Panel B: U.S. SPAC IPO Proceeds by Year ($ Billions)
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